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olivér istván tóth
A Fresh Look at the Role of the Second 
Kind of Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Considering the second kind of knowledge in terms of everyday epistemic situa-
tions proved to be especially hard for scholars of Spinoza because of the obscure 
status of common notions. There are two classes of common notions: general 
common notions, which are properties that everything has, and particular com-
mon notions, which are properties shared by specific individuals. Obviously, the 
former class does not provide comprehensive informative knowledge about the 
given durational individual, and the latter has also been interpreted as providing 
general properties. The two most important rival interpretations in terms of the 
attribute of extension have identified particular common notions with very ba-
sic physical/geometrical properties of matter (Brandom 1976) or infinite modes 
(Marshall 2008; wilson 1996; Curley 1973; Steinberg 2009). In addition, a nov-
el interpretation of modal properties has also been proposed (Schliesser 2014). 
There is a twofold problem with these interpretations concerning the scope of 
practically available adequate knowledge. On the one hand, they seem to rad-
ically restrict the possible objects of knowledge of the second kind which—
combined with the fact that attaining the third kind of knowledge is almost 
practically impossible—makes us very reliant on knowledge of the first kind. On 
the other hand, interpretations identifying common notions with infinite modes 
or modal properties imply that—in accordance with Spinoza’s rationalism—the 
objects of the second kind of knowledge are ultimately eternal truths. Since this 
reading gives no room for adequate knowledge about durational entities, it is 
hard to see how could knowledge about particular durational entities rather than 
eternal truths be acquired with regard to durational entities. In other words, it is 
hard to see how knowledge of an adequately known eternal truth about a given 
durational particular can be of a given durational entity if sufficient knowledge 
1  I would like to thank Ursula Renz and Gábor Boros for their comments on an earlier 
version of the manuscript, although it goes without saying that I accept full responsibility 
for any errors all of which do not tarnish the reputations of these esteemed persons. I would 
like to thank Andrea Sangiacomo and Oberto Marrama as well for discussing these issues on 
a number of occasions.
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only concerns eternal truths. Even though both lines of interpretation correlate 
well with Della Rocca’s influential interpretation, which denies the possibility 
of actual knowledge in finite subjects (Della Rocca 1996; Della Rocca 2008), 
they are at odds with Spinoza’s rather optimistic statements concerning the pos-
sibility of human cognition.
In this paper a reading of the second kind of knowledge which reconciles 
knowledge derived from common notions with the practical usefulness of this 
kind of knowledge is presented. Three claims are argued for by developing the 
interpretation of Renz and Boros. First, contrary to the claims of Schliesser, ex-
perimental science is indeed part of the second kind of knowledge (Boros 1997, 
128; Renz 2010, 289). Second, by using Renz’s reliabilist conception of adequa-
cy for the interpretation of common notions it is shown that adequate knowl-
edge about durational individuals in finite minds can be rendered practically 
possible (Renz forthcoming). Third, Boros’ metaphysical distinction between 
general and particular common notions shows that the second kind of knowl-
edge presupposes imaginative experience (Boros 1997, 131).
In order to achieve this, first, the second kind of knowledge is examined 
through the close reading of propositions E2p38–40, which are cited in the offi-
cial definition of the second kind of knowledge. Based on these texts, the pro-
cess by which the second kind of knowledge is generated is presented. Second, 
in order to have a better grasp of this, those places where Spinoza describes 
the production of rational knowledge are examined: since the second kind of 
knowledge is identified with reason this should yield an insight into the actual 
epistemic situations in which it is useful. Reliance on these loci is necessary 
since Spinoza hardly refers to the second kind of knowledge as such. Finally, 
in the third section my personal interpretation is outlined which argues that 
adequate knowledge of durational particulars is possible and the second kind of 
knowledge is practically useful.
II. THE SECOND KIND OF KNOwLEDGE
Spinoza defines the second kind of knowledge in E2p40s2,2 where he identifies 
it with reason: “we perceive many things and form universal notions: […] from 
the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of 
2  All references to Spinoza’s works are from Curley’s translation (Curley 1988, 2016) with 
the usual abbreviations: E stands for Ethics, prae – preface, a – axiom, p – proposition, s – 
scholium, c – corollary, app – appendix, L – lemma, and d – definition if it immediately fol-
lows the number of the part and demonstration in all other cases. Ep. stands for letters fol-
lowed by the number and year in parenthesis.
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things (see P38C, P39, P39C, and P40). This I shall call reason and the second 
kind of knowledge.” The referenced propositions together present the general 
outline of the second kind of knowledge which will be examined in this section.
1. E2p38c
According to E2p38c: “From this [E2p38] it follows that there are certain ideas, 
or notions, common to all men. For (by L2) all bodies agree in that, which (by 
P38) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all”.3 The main 
proposition of E2p38 states that: “That which is common to all, and which is 
equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.”4 The 
demonstration states that the human mind includes ideas concerning the parts 
of the body (E2p12–13) and since certain “things”5 are equally in the part and 
the whole (according to E2p11c) God will consider these insofar as He consti-
tutes the essence of the human mind. Also, since these are common to every 
body, even in the case of affections which involve the natures of the human and 
external bodies, their idea will be in God insofar as He constitutes the essence 
of the human mind.6 Since having an adequate idea is defined in E2p11c as God 
having an idea insofar as He constitutes the essence of the human mind, the 
human mind must have adequate ideas of these.
This demonstration consists of two interesting features. First, the readings 
presented in the introduction presuppose an understanding of the causal axiom 
in line with Della Rocca’s interpretation, according to which to know something 
adequately entails knowing adequately all of its causes, as well as the causes of 
its causes. Of course, this requirement is very hard to meet concerning actually 
existing finite things of which efficient causes are part of the infinite causal 
chains constituting the order of nature and as such these readings deny the pos-
sibility of adequate knowledge concerning actually existing durational entities. 
3  Hinc sequitur, dari quasdam ideas, sive notiones omnibus hominibus communes. Nam 
(per Lem. 2.) omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt, quæ (per Prop. præced.) ab omnibus 
debent adæquate, sive clare, & distincte percipi. (The translation of Curley has been modi-
fied.)
4  Illa, quæ omnibus communia, quæque æque in parte, ac in toto sunt, non possunt conci-
pi, nisi adæquate. (The translation of Curley has been modified.)
5  Spinoza does not use the term “res” in these propositions and “proprietas” is only intro-
duced in E2p39d. By highlighting the ambiguity of the status of general common notions, 
referring to them as either things or properties was avoided—this is reflected in my modi-
fication of Curley’s translation—but wherever grammar requires, they will be referred to as 
“things”—using the term common notions would have introduced circularity in Spinoza’s 
argument—emphasizing this ambiguity.
6  For an interpretation of Spinoza’s use of God having ideas see Renz 2010; Renz 2011; 
Renz 2015.
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In this context it is worth noting that causal history does not play any part what-
soever in the demonstration of adequacy.
Second, these common notions are treated in a suspiciously similar manner to 
universals, which seems to be problematic given Spinoza’s adherence to nomi-
nalism (E2p40s1, Hübner 2016; cf. Gabbey 1995). It seems that these “things” 
are numerically the same in everything or, to be more technical, the same 
“things” inhere in everything. The demonstration—at least the part concern-
ing the knowledge of affections of the body—works only if it does not matter 
whether someone has an idea of his or her instance of this “thing” or someone 
else’s instance of this “thing”. By knowing the “thing” in one’s own body that 
person already knows it in the external body and therefore the fact that in the 
affection of the body that person’s nature and the external nature are mixed is 
of no significance.
On the one hand, this makes sense in terms of the broadly Cartesian physics 
employed by Spinoza, since according to E2L1 the simplest bodies are only 
distinguished by their most basic physical properties—motion and rest, speed 
and slowness—and nothing rules out the possibility that some of the simplest 
bodies exhibit the same basic physical properties (cf. Gabbey 1995; Melamed 
2010; Gaukroger 2011). yet, this still does not answer the question concerning 
whether common “things” are the same “thing” in everything or different in-
stantiations of the same property. The second option in my view is untenable: 
if multiple instantiations of the same essence are not ruled out on the level of 
general common notions. How can it be ruled out on higher physical levels since 
the principle of individuation relies on the same notion and rest as in the case 
of complex bodies. Also, would there be any means by which the two different 
instantiations could count as two different bodies since it seems that the iden-
tity of matter also depends on instantiated physical properties. Thus, the tenta-
tive conclusion that common notions refer to “things” which feature as parts in 
everything can be drawn.7
Given this conclusion, the corollary follows rather seamlessly from the prop-
osition: it basically repeats the claim that since there are “things” that are in 
everything and the human mind has an idea of everything which is in it, the hu-
man mind will have an idea of these “things”. In this context the phrase “equally 
in the part and in the whole” seems to indicate that even though these “things” 
are in everything they are fully and not only partially inherent in everything, an 
7  Of course, it is notoriously difficult to decide how to interpret the metaphysical category 
of modes: whether they are properties, events or tokens (cf. Lin 2006; Melamed 2013b; Renz 
2010, 58 ff.). what is important with regard to the present discussion is that whatever the 
common “things” are, they are numerically the same in every individual.
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adequate idea of them can be formed based on this relation. The interesting 
component of this corollary is its reference to E2L2, which seems to point to the 
physical description of these “things”:
All bodies agree in certain things.
Dem.: For all bodies agree in that they involve the concept of one and the 
same attribute (by D1), and in that they can move now more slowly, now more 
quickly, and absolutely, that now they move, now they are at rest. (E2L2)
This reference seems to limit rather radically the scope of “things” that are 
common to all: namely to being extended and exhibiting the single property 
which was used to individuate the simplest of bodies in E2L1 and which fea-
tures as the “immediate infinite mode” in Ep.64 (1675). Since the immediate 
infinite mode of extension is supposed to follow from the essence of the attrib-
ute of extension (E1p21–23), this enumeration might point to the mode of in-
terpreting the common notions as referring to them as infinite modes. However, 
the fact that the “mediate infinite mode” of extension, the “face of the whole 
universe”, is not mentioned might point us in the opposite direction (though 
this might be because the universal individual is not “equally in the part and in 
the whole”).
2. E2p39&c
The second locus cited in the definition of the second kind of knowledge is 
E2p39: “If something is common to, and peculiar to, the human body and cer-
tain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected, and is equally 
in the part and in the whole of each of them, its idea will also be adequate in the 
mind”. This demonstration starts with the supposition that there is something 
which is equally in the part and in the whole of both the human and external 
bodies, but not in everything. If the external body affects the human body in 
this regard, the resulting affection will involve it. Also since this involvement is 
the result of both the affecting body and the body affected, the idea of the re-
sulting affection can be conceived through the nature of the human mind alone 
and therefore the human mind will have an adequate idea of it.
There are a number of interesting points in this demonstration. First, while 
in E2p38 Spinoza discusses unspecified “things”, in E2p39d he identifies that 
which is “common to, and peculiar to” the human and external bodies as a prop-
erty.8 Second, since in this demonstration there is no mention of the frequency 
8  Of course, how important this is depends on our metaphysical understanding of modes 
and whether modes and properties are distinguishable, see note 7.
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of affection, the term “usually affected” is probably better read as “actually af-
fected”. Third, and contrary to the previous point, it is not immediately clear 
what role the affection actually plays: the demonstration explicitly states that 
the common property was adequately conceived by God insofar as He had estab-
lished the idea of the human body prior to the affection and that the idea of the 
resulting affection is adequate only as far as the common property is concerned. 
This might suggest that the new element is the association of the common prop-
erty with the external body: the belief that property A of the human body is also 
a property of a particular external body. The status of this new element is, how-
ever, not clear: do the ideas of the common property belong to the human body 
and does the affection consist of ideas composed of two different properties or of 
the same property? If they are different what individuates them, if they are the 
same what has changed? For the same reason as in the case of common “things” 
in E2p38, it can be argued that they must be the same idea. But most impor-
tantly the interpretation of the third locus that is cited, the corollary to E2p39, 
depends on the answer to this question. The corollary is as follows: “From this it 
follows that the mind is the more capable of perceiving many things adequately 
as its body has many things in common with other bodies.” As mentioned pre-
viously, in some sense the adequate perception of many things—where many 
things is understood as properties of external bodies—depends on the adequate 
perception of the properties of the human body, since in this demonstration 
the property “common to, and peculiar to” the human and external bodies was 
already in such a relationship with the body that an adequate idea could be 
formed of it (which could have been conceived through the essence of the mind 
alone). That is, on the assumption that the property is numerically the same 
in both the human and external bodies. The fact that the human and external 
bodies have a mutual property does not seem to increase the “things”—under-
stood as properties—perceived adequately, but rather it increases the number 
of bodies of which the given property can be truthfully predicated. However, 
by paying attention to the language of E2p39d and E2p11c, a slight difference 
can be seen: namely in E2p11c possessing an adequate idea that is described as 
God having an idea insofar as He is constituting the essence of the human mind, 
while in E2p39d God only has the idea insofar as He has an idea of the human 
body. This indicates that affecting is indeed necessary for forming adequate 
ideas. Even though the human body had previously possessed a property which 
was in it “equally in the part and in the whole”, it could not form an adequate 
idea of it without the stimulus of an external body affecting it with the same 
property and therefore God could not have an idea of this insofar as He was con-
stituting the essence of the human mind, only insofar as He had an idea of the 
human body. This is also supported by my interpretation of the phrase “usually 
affected” in the main proposition.
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The status of this corollary is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, it is 
used only once, in the definition of the second kind of knowledge in E2p40s2. 
On the other hand, its claim is repeated several times in Ethics in a slightly mod-
ified form: as the link between the body’s capability to affect and be affected 
and between the mind’s ability to understand. Since this claim is central to the 
understanding of the second kind of knowledge as reason, it will be elaborated 
on in the final section. But it is important that the usual claim is about affecting 
and being affected and in E2p39d there is nothing that presupposes that the 
external body is affecting the human body and not vice versa. Therefore, an 
interpretation can be proposed in which the corollary could be rephrased more 
precisely as the following claim: the more the body is capable of having affec-
tions with properties common to external and causally related bodies, the more 
the mind is capable of perceiving many things adequately.
3. E2p40
The fourth and last locus cited in the definition of the second kind of knowl-
edge is E2p40: “whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are ade-
quate in the mind are also adequate”. According to the demonstration the claim 
follows from E2p11c: since adequate ideas are in God insofar as He constitutes 
the essence of the human mind, whatever follows from these ideas will be in 
God in the same fashion. The interesting question which remains unanswered 
here is whether an adequate idea that follows from another adequate idea nec-
essarily exists in the subject, or does conceiving an idea, for which sufficient 
conceptual resources are present, still require some extra effort from the subject. 
In my opinion the considerations concerning E2p39d&c suggest that extra ef-
fort is needed: it is possible that one has an adequate idea of x, namely that y is 
the logical consequence of x, yet still fails to entertain the idea of y (cf. E2p47s).
These four loci show us the basic structure of the second kind of knowl-
edge. The human mind has adequate ideas of those extended modes which 
fully inhere in an affection of the human body and in an unmixed manner. This 
can happen (i) if the extended mode is ubiquitous (E2p38), (ii) if the extended 
mode is fully in the external and human bodies in an unmixed manner (E2p39), 
or (iii) if the extended mode occurred in the human body where the causal chain 
involves only modes of types (i) and (ii) (E2p40).
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III. REASON IN ACTION
Spinoza identifies in the definition of E2p40s2 the second kind of knowledge 
with reason as opposed to imagination—the first kind of knowledge—or intui-
tive knowledge—the third kind of knowledge. This is a very strong claim, since 
in E5prae he identifies power of the mind with power of reason and in E4app4 
identifies reason with intellect. Also the free man, Spinoza’s ethical ideal, is one 
“who is led by reason alone” (E4p68d). These claims do not seem to facilitate 
the third kind of knowledge: after all, if the ethical ideal can be reached by 
using reason alone and since reason is understanding according to the second 
kind of knowledge, then striving for the third kind of knowledge seems to be an 
epistemological and ethical luxury. The third kind of knowledge is beyond the 
scope of this paper; but it should be pointed out that the claim is less strong if 
the fact that Spinoza does not recognize distinct faculties (imagination, reason, 
intuition, intellect, will, etc.) in the human mind (cf. Hampe 2011) is taken into 
consideration. Instead, Spinoza’s claims concerning reason and rational knowl-
edge will be used to get a better grasp of the intended practical scope of the sec-
ond kind of knowledge. This is necessary because—as discussed in the previous 
section—the description of the knowledge-producing mechanism of the second 
kind of knowledge is very abstract and theoretical. Since it is not clear what 
can be regarded as a common notion, especially a property “common to, and 
peculiar to” human and external bodies, the practical import of the second kind 
of knowledge has been called into question. In this section, based on the uses 
of the loci cited in the definition of the second kind of knowledge and on the 
relevant references to reason, it is argued that if rational knowledge is indeed 
knowledge of the second kind, it is central to Spinoza’s ethical project.
1. Reason, Common Notions and the Second Kind of Knowledge
In order to justify my reliance on the use of reason for describing the scope of 
the second kind of knowledge it has to be shown that the identification of the 
reason and the second kind of knowledge in E2p40s2 was not a fleeting thought 
on Spinoza’s part but in fact he did indeed use them interchangeably. The rela-
tionship between knowledge from common notions—which in my view can be 
undoubtedly described as the second kind of knowledge—and reason is sup-
ported by E5p7d and E5p12d:
an affect arising from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things 
(see the Def. of reason in IIP40S2), which we always regard as present (for there can 
be nothing which excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in 
the same way (by IIP38). (E5p7d)
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Things we understand clearly and distinctly are either common properties of things 
or deduced from them (see the Def. of reason in IIP40S2), and consequently (by P11) 
are aroused in us more often. (E5p12d)
Each of these claims has an interesting element, besides restating the relation-
ship of common notions and reason. In E5p7d a new element is introduced by 
referring to E2p38, namely that ideas related to the common notions are very 
powerful since they are always regarded as present (cf. E2p44).9 In this context 
regarding something as present is not in accordance with the contemporary no-
tion of apparent belief, rather it is part of our set of standing beliefs and excludes 
the possibility of having ideas contrary to it. In E5p12d Spinoza states that clear 
and distinct ideas are derived from common notions, as described in the defi-
nition of the second kind of knowledge. This raises a question concerning the 
relationship between the second and third kinds of knowledge, which, however, 
is outside the scope of this paper.
The same identification of reason and adequacy is stated in E4p27d, even 
though the interpretation of the claim is hindered by the equivocal reference 
to the scholium of E2p40: “the mind (by IIP41, P43 and P43S) has certainty 
of things only insofar as it has adequate ideas, or (what is the same thing, by 
IIP40S) insofar as it reasons”. If it is assumed—following Mignini’s and Sangi-
acomo’s editions of the text (Spinoza 2007, 2011)—that the reference is to the 
second scholium of E2p40, then Spinoza cites the definition of the second kind 
of knowledge for supporting a claim about reason. This lends more support to 
the claim that reason and the second kind of knowledge were indeed synony-
mous as far as Spinoza was concerned.
This claim about reason is reiterated in E4p26d in terms of a reference to 
E2p40s2:
The striving to preserve itself is nothing but the essence of the thing itself (by IIIP7), 
which, insofar as it exists as it does, is conceived to have a force for persevering in 
existing (by IIIP6) and for doing those things which necessarily follow from its given 
nature (see the definition of appetite in IIIP9S). But the essence of reason is nothing 
but our mind, insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see the definition of this 
in IIP40S2). Therefore, (by IIP40) whatever we strive for from reason is nothing but 
understanding. […]
The identification of reason with the second kind of knowledge is further sup-
ported by the reference to E2p40, which was cited in E2p40s2 as one of the 
propositions describing the operation of the second kind of knowledge. The 
9  For the purposes of this paper the difficulties arising from the use of the word imagine and 
its relation to the first kind of knowledge have been disregarded.
46 OLIVéR ISTVáN TóTH
claim of this passage—namely that rational ideas follow from the essence of the 
human mind and therefore the working of reason is understanding—also fits 
nicely with my interpretation of E2p39, according to which the second kind of 
knowledge through the generation of affections turns ideas which were in God, 
insofar as He had an idea of our body, into ideas which are in God insofar as He 
constitutes the essence of the human mind.
2. Reason is the Virtue of the Mind
The relationship between the essence of the mind and rational ideas is used 
several times to identify reason with the virtue of the human mind:
man’s true power of acting, or virtue, is reason itself (by IIIP3), which man considers 
clearly and distinctly (by IIP40 and P43). (E4p52d)
Acting absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but acting, living, and preserving 
our being (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the 
foundation of seeking one’s own advantage. (E4p24)
In both E4p24 and E4p52d virtue is defined by citing E3p3, which shows that 
whatever our rational ideas are they are adequately caused by the essence of the 
human mind. 
This is further supported by the inference made in E4p35, namely that hu-
mans share their nature—essence—and rational ideas follow from the essence of 
the human mind which according to the parallelism/identity doctrine is identical 
to human essence: “insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, 
must they always agree in nature”. Finally, the same reference to E3p3 is used 
in E4p59 in order to support the claim about the power of reason.
To every action to which we are determined from an affect which is a passion, we can 
be determined by reason, without that affect.
Dem.: Acting from reason is nothing but doing those things which follow from the 
necessity of our nature, considered in itself alone (by IIIP3 and D2). But sadness is 
evil insofar as it decreases or restrains this power of acting (by P41). Therefore, from 
this affect we cannot be determined to any action which we could not do if we were 
led by reason.
The interpretation of this proposition is somewhat hindered by the ambiguity of 
its wording: action is defined in E3d3 as something which is adequately caused 
by the body, while passion is defined there as something of which the body is 
an inadequate cause. This seems to exclude the possibility that an inadequately 
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caused affect can cause an adequately caused affect, therefore action is best read 
colloquially what the body does.10 As a result, this renders the proposition impor-
tant since on this reading it shows that if reason is indeed identical to the second 
kind of knowledge, its scope is rather large and able to motivate anything. And 
it seems trivial that neither knowledge of general geometrical properties nor of 
eternal properties can motivate actions directed at durational ends.
3. What Can Be Understood from Common Notions?
This conclusion about the practical consequences of rational ideas can be inter-
preted in two different ways: either Spinoza was not consistent in his identifi-
cation of reason and the second kind of knowledge after all, or the scope of the 
knowledge acquired from common notions is broader than is usually thought. 
The scope of the second kind of knowledge is defined most unambiguously in 
E5p36cs:
Again, because the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is 
the beginning and foundation (by IP15 and IIP47S), it is clear to us how our mind, 
with respect both to essence and existence, follows from the divine nature, and con-
tinually depends on God.
I thought this worth the trouble of noting here, in order to show by this example 
how much the knowledge of singular things I have called intuitive, or knowledge of 
the third kind (see IIP40S2), can accomplish, and how much more powerful it is than 
the universal knowledge I have called knowledge of the second kind. For although 
I have shown generally in Part I that all things (and consequently the human mind 
also) depend on God both for their essence and their existence, nevertheless, that 
demonstration, though legitimate and put beyond all chance of doubt, still does not 
affect our mind as much as when this is inferred from the very essence of any singular 
thing which we say depends on God.
Unfortunately, Spinoza does not use the term reason in this context. He, howev-
er, repeats the claim made in E2p40s2, namely that the second kind of knowl-
edge yields knowledge of general properties, while the third kind of knowledge 
provides knowledge of particular essences. The fascinating element is that he 
provides an example of this distinction: without providing an exact reference, 
Spinoza points towards a claim made in the first part of Ethics as an example of 
a less powerful and universal, but still indubitable, knowledge, while the appli-
10  On the other hand, this reading seems to imply the questionable claim that rationally 
motivated suicide is possible; but this topic is beyond the scope of this paper (cf. Garrett 2002; 
Viljanen 2011; Della Rocca 1995).
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cation of this knowledge to a particular essence is the third kind of knowledge. 
If this claim can be taken seriously, it provides us with a very concrete exam-
ple of the second kind of knowledge: it shows that the propositions made in 
Ethics—not qua being part of Ethics but qua being absolutely certain (cf. Ep.76 
(1675))—belong to the body of knowledge of the second kind. This may lend 
further credence to the otherwise seemingly careless claim in E1p8s2 according 
to which E1p7 is actually a common notion, of which the ignorant are, howev-
er, unaware. E2p46d reinforces the need to take this seriously where—based 
on E2p38—Spinoza indeed demonstrates that knowledge of God’s infinite and 
eternal essence is a common notion. The fact that a claim outlined in Ethics turns 
out to be knowledge of the second kind indicates that in Spinoza’s view the 
definitions and axioms of Ethics are precisely those common notions which are 
in God insofar as He has an idea of the human body and which have to be trans-
formed by a stimulus into one He has insofar as He is constituting the essence of 
the human mind (cf. Gabbey 1995, 157). If this interpretation is indeed correct, 
then the claim of E4p59 does not seem to be problematic at all.
This broader scope of knowledge acquired by the second kind of knowledge, 
compatible with the claim of E4p59, is reinforced by E5p4:
There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form [some]11 clear and distinct 
concept.
Dem.: Those things which are common to all can only be conceived adequately (by 
IIP38), and so (by IIP12 and L2 [11/98]) there is no affection of the body of which we 
cannot form some clear and distinct concept, q.e.d.
Here the references to E2p38 and E2L2 show that Spinoza uses common no-
tions to justify his claims about knowledge. Unfortunately, the wording is again 
very general and theoretical, and the proposition is not cited very often (once in 
E5p14) so it does not provide a clear example of knowledge of the second kind. 
But its scholium is referenced in E5p20s as the first strategy against the rule 
of passions. This proposition clearly concerns knowledge gained from common 
notions, which is knowledge of the second kind: the fact that this knowledge is 
included in the five most useful strategies against the passions shows that Spi-
noza clearly intended knowledge of the second kind and not just rational knowl-
edge—which may or may not be identical to the second kind of knowledge—to 
be of practical importance.
11  Curley’s translation has been modified following the Latin original in order to reflect the 
repetition of the claim before the QED. The original term is aliquem.
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IV. ROLE OF THE SECOND KIND OF KNOwLEDGE IN SPINOZA’S  
ETHICAL PROJECT
So far in this paper it has been shown that the general working of the second 
kind of knowledge and presented support for my claim that its scope is wide, 
including the propositions demonstrated in Ethics, are able to motivate any hu-
man activity and provide a practically useful remedy for the passions. In this 
final section an interpretation based on these findings that can overcome the 
difficulties mentioned in the introduction and account for the widespread use of 
rational knowledge in Ethics is developed.
1. Possibility of Adequacy
The first difficulty concerning the practical use of the second kind of knowledge 
is Della Rocca’s claim according to which finite subjects are not able to form 
adequate ideas about anything other than very general properties. The argu-
ment is based on the causal axiom (E1a4) according to which: “The knowledge 
of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.” Since al-
most all causes—except for God and the attributes—are simultaneously effects, 
the causal axiom can be applied repeatedly and therefore it seems that for the 
knowledge of any given effect the knowledge of an infinitely long causal chain 
would be required. This is practically impossible for any finite mind and there-
fore no finite object can be known adequately.
while the argument is valid, it is striking that nowhere does Spinoza seem 
to be particularly bothered by this (Garrett 2014): as has been seen in section 
two he happily embraces claims about the mind’s adequate knowledge of both 
theoretical principles (like God’s causal power) and particular entities (like hu-
man affects). According to my interpretation this is because Della Rocca’s recon-
struction does not appreciate the particularity of common notions: as has been 
seen both in E2p38 and E2p39 it is not the case that the common properties of 
the human and external bodies are two instances of the same property, but are 
rather numerically the same property. This allows the formation of adequate 
ideas even in the face of the causal requirement of E3p3: the human mind can 
only form an adequate idea of the resulting affection if the human body is the 
adequate cause of the affection. This seems to be incompatible with the fact 
that there are numerically two causes: the external and human bodies, even 
though they share the given property. As has been seen in E2p39 and E2p40 it is 
not the case that the external body just happens to affect the human body at the 
same instance when the human body autonomously produces the same effect: 
the stimulus of the external cause is necessary to connect the given property to 
the essence of the human body and thereby transform the idea in God from His 
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idea of our body into an idea in God insofar as He constitutes the essence of the 
human mind.
This means that those infinitely long causal chains may not be that long after 
all: even though countless causes have contributed to my existence, those causes 
were a result of the same simple bodies of which all of us are formed and there-
fore it is not necessary to understand physically and temporally distant objects 
in order to acquire self-knowledge. This does not mean that the comprehensive 
understanding of the given particular’s essence and existence—as required by 
the third kind of knowledge (Renz forthcoming)—would be possible without 
understanding an infinite number of causes, but understanding properties of 
particulars can be achieved without knowing an infinite chain of finite causes.
By taking the analogy of E5p36cs into consideration, knowing how this par-
ticular bowl came about—made of glass, fragile in nature, green and shaped in 
a specific way—is something that requires complete knowledge and involves 
knowing an infinite number of finite causes that contributed to these effects 
(Shein 2015). Knowing, however, that this particular bowl made of glass is fragile 
requires far less knowledge which can all be traced back to the physical proper-
ties of the given object which—according to the assumption—it shares with the 
physical properties of the human body and for which the conceptual resources 
are available in the finite human mind.
2. Possibility of Knowledge of Durational Objects
The second difficulty concerning the second kind of knowledge has been the 
claim that it concerns knowledge of eternal entities: infinite modes or modal 
properties. If unmitigated this would mean that Schliesser’s characterization 
of Spinoza—someone who is rather sceptical about the existence of scientific 
knowledge and is more interested in the knowledge of the eternal substance 
furnishing the mind with impersonal eternity (Schliesser 2014)—would be justi-
fied. Schliesser’s claim is founded on two aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy. First, 
according to him experience provides only imaginative ideas which—because of 
both the synchronically and diachronically infinite causal chains—are necessar-
ily inadequate, therefore knowledge of the durational world is impossible. Sec-
ond, what can be known adequately are eternal truths, which are unchanging: 
since the durational world is characteristically changing—duration only exists 
because there is change—this knowledge does not yield much information con-
cerning this world.
The argument presented in the previous paragraph even seems to support 
this line of thought: knowing both the essence and existence of a particular 
object would require knowledge of its efficient causes which is only possible 
once complete knowledge is attained, but properties of objects—what the ob-
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ject would be in itself, its formal essence—can be known, since they are eternal 
truths. However, it can be argued that this argument does not take into account 
the phenomenological consequences of Spinoza’s parallelism doctrine: there are 
no free floating ideas, every idea is an idea in the mind of an actual finite subject 
(Renz 2010; Renz 2011; Renz 2015; Zigouras 2007). Therefore every idea of 
intellect has to be somehow connected to the idea of which object is the actu-
ally existing human body—the human mind—which means that its object has 
to be related to the actual human body. That is, as has been seen in the case of 
E2p39–40, besides the logical relationship required for having an adequate idea 
an additional physical/cognitive effort is needed. It is not enough that the hu-
man mind has the conceptual resources to come up with an idea, it has to actu-
ally have that idea. No matter whether common notions refer to infinite modes 
or not—I agree with Renz that the less an interpretation relies on the doctrine 
of infinite modes, the better it is (Renz forthcoming; cf. Melamed 2013a)—they 
cannot be entertained without thinking them of an actual object. That is, one 
cannot entertain the idea of extension as such, only the idea of extension inher-
ing in this or that object; one cannot entertain the idea of the essence of man 
in general, only the idea of the essence of this or that man: otherwise one has a 
confused and mutilated universal idea (E2p40s1).12 This shows that even if what 
is known adequately is an eternal truth, it is cognized by the finite subject as an 
eternal truth about a durational particular, which implies that adequate knowl-
edge about durational objects cannot be attained.
3. Reliability of the Second Kind of Knowledge
Having thus addressed the two main difficulties concerning the possibility of 
adequate knowledge of the second kind with regard to durational objects, where 
knowledge is a prerequisite of any practical application, let us now focus on the 
reliability criterion for knowledge of the second kind (Renz forthcoming).
when Spinoza introduces the way inadequate ideas are produced in E2p16–
18 he shows that the problem with ideas of imagination is that they: “indicate 
the condition of our own body more than the nature of the external bodies” 
(E2p16c2). As a result of this “mixing” or “blending” of natures (Della Rocca 
1996; Garrett 2008) they do not present the object as it is in itself, but rather as 
perceived by us, that is, as our body reacts to the given external body. There-
fore, depending on the physical condition of the body, as well as the experiential 
history of the given individual (Renz 2010), the same external cause can produce 
12  Discussion of the admittedly problematic conception of our idea of God is beyond the 
scope of this paper (E2p47s).
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contrary effects in the same subject (cf. E1app, E4prae) thereby hindering the 
rational coordination of the subject’s actions.
On the other hand, when the human body is affected by a property that it 
shares with the affecting body, this situation does not arise and there is no mix-
ing or blending of causes or essences: the resulting affection is an adequate ef-
fect of the given property which is already fully in the human body and ade-
quately known, as such an adequate idea of it can be formed. The degree to 
which the human body has this ability to share properties with external bodies 
is its aptitude to affect and be affected in many ways (Sangiacomo 2013; Sangia-
como 2015; Sangiacomo 2016). These shared properties allow the human mind 
to acquire knowledge of the external body as it is in itself and not as they af-
fect the human body. A slightly anachronistic formulation of this is that rational 
ideas refer to the primary, while imaginative ideas to the secondary qualities of 
objects. Therefore rational ideas are always perceived in the same way—as long 
as they refer to the same individual: my imaginative idea of the same music can 
be helpful or harmful depending on the constitution of my body (E4prae), 
but my rational idea of the music indicates its physical structure which does 
not change, unless the music itself changes. In this sense rational ideas are 
more reliable than imaginative ideas: not because the imaginative ones are 
all fictitious—like the idea of talking trees—since they can be grounded in 
the relationship between very real physical properties, but rather because the 
properties determining the quality of this relationship are unknown—i.e. they 
are inadequately caused.
The fact that aptitude as the foundation of the second kind of knowledge 
plays a crucial role in Spinoza’s epistemology shows that contrary to appearanc-
es this epistemological project is part of mainstream epistemology. In contrast 
to Gabbey, Marshall and Schliesser (Gabbey 1995; Marshall 2008; Schliesser 
2014), Spinoza does not discard experiential knowledge and try to produce ade-
quate ideas by reflecting on indubitable innate ideas; rather he aims to make the 
subject’s representations conform to the world by exhibiting outward directed 
epistemic efforts (cf. Pritchard 2013). In the language of the parallelism/identity 
doctrine this means that the order of the human body is made to conform to the 
order of the world by reordering the images according to the order of intellect 
instead of the order of affections. The fact that this epistemic project can be 
pursued is evident from E2p39c, which describes how properties common to ex-
ternal objects can be acquired, as opposed to E2p38, which describes the shared 
properties common to all (Boros 1997, 131).
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4. The Virtuous Circle of Nourishment and Scientific Knowledge
Having established the possibility of producing practically relevant knowledge 
of the second kind, let us focus on its benefits and evidence that there are two 
separate uses of the second kind of knowledge. One is nourishment, which re-
lies on the adequate knowledge produced by the second kind of knowledge and 
although beneficial in itself it does not produce knowledge. It makes the body 
more powerful and thereby more capable of using the other benefit, scientific 
inquiry, which is both beneficial and produces knowledge. The role of nourish-
ment is best summarized in E4app27:
The principal advantage we derive from things outside us—apart from the experience 
and knowledge we acquire from observing them and changing them from one form 
into another—lies in the preservation of our body. That is why those things are most 
useful to us which can feed and maintain it, so that all its parts can perform their 
function properly. For the more the body is [apt to] affecting, and being affected by, 
external bodies in a great many ways, the more the mind is [apt to] thinking (see P38 
and P39).
But there seem to be very few things of this kind in Nature. So to nourish the 
body in the way required, it is necessary to use many different kinds of food. Indeed, 
the human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which re-
quire continuous and varied food so that the whole body may be equally [apt to do] 
everything which can follow from its nature, and consequently, so that the mind may 
also be equally [apt to] conceiving many things.13
Here both benefits are mentioned: the clause within the dashes evokes E2p29cs 
which describes scientific knowledge production, when adequate ideas can be 
“determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, 
to understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions” (cf. Gabbey 1995, 
170). Also, Spinoza links the effect of nourishment to the aptitude of the body. 
A body which is well nourished—all of its constituent parts receive the neces-
sary degree of nourishment—is more capable of affecting and being affected. As 
has been seen, this implies that the body is able to have more in common with 
external bodies and therefore it is more active and less passive. Therefore, the 
mind is able to understand more things clearly and distinctly. In order to ob-
tain the necessary level of nourishment that includes “pleasant food and drink, 
with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, the 
theater” (E4p45c2s) one is required to possess a good working knowledge of 
the properties of these nutrients and their effects on our body. If this knowl-
13  Curley’s translation has been modified to reflect the ubiquity of the term aptitude in 
the text.
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edge is lacking, nourishment can turn into poison just as music—which would 
be normally good for someone who is melancholy—can become harmful if the 
same person starts mourning (E4prae). As the aptitude of the body increases as 
a result of proper nutrition, the body becomes more capable of possessing prop-
erties common to external bodies. This on its own does not produce knowledge: 
scientific investigation in E2p29cs, E4app27 and Ep.37 (1666) is described as 
reflecting on and comparing a number of already acquired adequate ideas. Thus, 
the more apt the body, the more adequate ideas will be available from which—
as a result of the epistemic effort—further adequate ideas can be deduced.
According to my interpretation, this is the virtuous circle of the second kind 
of knowledge: existing adequate ideas concerning the properties of the human 
body and external bodies are grounded in the scientific knowledge of the phys-
ical properties of these bodies and facilitate proper nourishment of the body. 
Proper nourishment is both beneficial for the overall health of the body and 
nourishes all the different parts of the human body. Proper nourishment en-
hances the aptitude of the body and therefore it is able to possess more prop-
erties in common with external bodies. These properties are its actions rather 
than its passions. In terms of attribute of thought this can be described as the 
mind’s increased ability to entertain numerous adequate ideas simultaneously 
(cf. E2p40s1). This ability allows the mind to understand the “agreements, dif-
ferences and oppositions” of its ideas and from these to produce by scientific 
knowledge production further ideas “determined internally”. These new ideas 
will in turn facilitate a better understanding of the external bodies and their 
effects on the human body. Therefore the more scientifically informed a human 
individual is, the more capable it will be of nourishing its body more effectively 
(cf. Renz forthcoming). This virtuous circle is only broken if a very powerful and 
unmitigated external cause reduces the aptitude of the human body—which 
can happen quite often in the durational world. However, this unfortunate cir-
cumstance does not change the general aim of Spinoza’s ethical project: “In this 
life, then, we strive especially that the infant’s body may change (as much as its 
nature allows and assists) into another, [apt to] a great many things and related to 
a mind very much conscious of itself, of God, and of things” (E5p39s).
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